Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, (Employer No. 002612-0).
Petitioner/Appellant, vs. Department of Workforce Services,
Workforce Appeals Board, Respondent/Appelle. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Scott Rawlings; attorney for appellant.
Nathan R. White; attorney for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fur Breeders Agricultural v. Workforce Services, No. 20161064 (Utah Court of Appeals,
2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4130

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APEALS

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, :
(Employer No. 002612-0).
:

.•

Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

.
Department of Workforce Services,

Appellate Case No.
20161064-CA

Workforce Appeals Board,
Respondent/Appelle.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL
Appeal from Decision of Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Work.force Services

NATHAN R. WHITE
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244

R. SCOTT RAWLINGS
3441 Decker Lake Drive
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84119

Attorney for Respondent/Appelle

Attorney for Petitioner/FILED
Appellant
UTAH APPELLATE C

OUATS

MAY 10 2017
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APEALS

vi

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, :
(Employer No. 002612-0).
•

.

Petitioner/Appellant,
~

.
.

vs.

Department of Workforce Services,
t.i)

.•
.•
.•

Workforce Appeals Board,
Respondent/Appelle.

.•
••
.
•
.••

Appellate Case No.
20161064-CA

••

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL
Appeal from Decision of Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services

NATHAN R. WHITE
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244

R. SCOTT RAWLINGS
3441 Decker Lake Drive
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84119

Attorney for Respondent/Appelle

Attorney for Petitioner/
Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES •••••••.••••••••••••••.••.••••••.•••••• 2-4
STATEMENT OF
JURISDICTION••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••4-S
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••• 5-6
STANDARD FOR
REVIEW •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••.••••••••••7
STATEMENT OF THE
CASE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••8
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO
ISSUES ON APPEAL •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••...••••••••8-12
SUMMARTY OF THE
ARGUMENTS •••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••.••••••••..•••.•••..••. 12-14
ARGUMENTS •••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••...••••• 14-35
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF
SOUGHT ••••••••••••...••.•••••.•••••....•••••..•.••.•.••••••..•••.35-36

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Adams v. Board of Review ofIndus. Comm'n, 821 P,2d 1, 4 ... 7,28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Department of the Airforce v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451
(Utah App. 1991) ......................................................... ... 29, 31
Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).. 7
Evolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT
App 61, 374 P.3d 406 ... ................................................ .... 31
First National Bank ofBoston v. County Board of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990) ......................... 29, 31, 34

vu
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board ofReview, 776 P.2d 63, 67
(Utah App 1989) ............................................................ .28, 29, 31
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department ofEnvtl. Quality, 843 P.2d
1045, 1047 (Utah App 1992) ........................................ 28
Leach v. Board ofReview Indus. Comm 'n, 123 Utah 423,
260 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah 1953) ...................................... 28, 31
Martinez v. Media Paymaster Plus, 207 UT 42, 164
P.3d384 ................................................................. 7
Needle Inc. v. Dept't pf Workforce Servs., 2016 UT
App 84 (Utah Ct. App. 216) ......................................... 29
Petro-Hunt, LLC v. Dep 't pf Workforce Servs., 197
P.3d 107,114 (Utah App 2008) ...................................... 26, 27
Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 811
P.2d 665, 669 (Utah 1991) ............................................ 7
Tasters Ltd., v. Department of Employment Sec., 863
P.2d 12 (Utah 1993) ................................................... 29, 31, 33

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204 ........................................ 16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204(1) .................................... 8, 12, 16. 17
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204(3) .................................... 8, 12, 17
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-208 ....................................... 8, 12
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-402(3) .................................... 34
Utah Code Ann. §3SA-4-508(4)(5) ................................ . 5
Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-401 ........................................ 5
Utah Code Ann. §63G-46b-16(4) ................................... 13, 28, 29,
31,33, 35

RULES

Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303 .................................. 13, 18
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b) ........................... 6, 17, 27
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1 )(b)(iii) ....................... 17
Utah Admin Code R994-204-303(1 )(iv) ........................... 33
Utah Admin Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(iii) ....................... 27, 33
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(v) ...................... .33
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(2)(b ) ........................... 6, 17

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. §3SA-4-S08(4)(5), Utah Employment Security Act, Utah
Administrative Code (1997); and, Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-401.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue #1:

Did Workforce Services Adjudicative Division err in the

application of rules/guidelines, weight of testimony and determination
of off-duty Unified Police Officers as employees of Appellant rather
than independent contractors based upon the 03/01/2016
"Determination of Employment" (Mark
Peterson, Field Auditor)

1

[

R 72-76]; Hearing Officer Susan Cottam's

"Conclusion" of 07/20/2016; Telephonic Hearing before Hon. Gary
Gibbs, ALJ
on October 5, 2016 "Decision and Order 1[R 104-143]; and,
~

Department of Workforce Services Appeals Unit "Decision" of
12/07/2016 1[R151-166]?

1/iP
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Issue #2:

Did the Board of Appeals err in application of the weight and
{jw

the particular scrutiny of the facts of the service relationship, as set
forth in Utah Administrative Rules, subsections R994-204-303( 1)(b)
and R994-204-303(2)(b), having failed to weigh the importance of
each factor depending upon the unique service and factual context of
the services performed by off-duty Unified Police Department (UPD)

~

Officers to this Appellant, in which some factors do not apply to
certain such unique circustances?

Issue #3:

Did the Board of Appeals err in refusing or not giving full

consideration to prior testimony given before Hearing Officer Susan
Cottom (07/20/2016) which was noted by the ALJ as
records/documents provided in the " ... original Department
Decision .... "; at which direct testimony was provided by two (2) UPD
detectives who participated in providing independent contractor
services to Appellant, but otherwise not given consideration by the
ALJ in his "Decision and Order" 1 [R 11 0]?

1

"R" refers to the Record in this case and the numbered pages from the
Record.

6I

1/
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent a legislative grant of discretion, this court reviews an agency's
interpretation of its organic statute for correctness, granting no deference
to the agency's interpretation. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus,
2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384.
Whether an administrative agency's findings are adequate is a legal
determination that requires no deference. See Adams v. Board of
Review ofIndus. Comm 'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ).

Court will reverse an administrative agency's findings of fact "only if
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v.
Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).
A determination of substantial prejudice is required as a prerequisite

to appellate review to " ... ensure that a court will not issue advisory
opinions reviewing agency action when no true controversy has
resulted." Savage Indus., Inc v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 811 P.2d
665, 669 (Utah 1991 ).
iJ
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the final Decision of the Board of Appeals,
Workforce Services entered in this matter on December 7, 2016 and more
specifically upholding the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
entered on October 12, 2016 holding that off-duty Unified Police
Department officers providing additional police presence near and
Close to Appellant, Fur Breeder Agricultural Cooperative (FBAC)'s
building, plant and facilities during evening/night times and hours when
there is consistent police presence otherwise near FBAC, are deemed
employees ofFBAC and not independent contractors pursuant to §§35A
4-204(1), 204(3), and 208 of the Utah Employment Security Act.
{QiiJ

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL

Findings, reasoning and conclusions of the law of the Administrative
Law Judge, where not inconsistent with the decision of Workforce
Appeals Board were adopted in full.
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Appellant FBAC manufactures and distributes animal feed (primarily
mink feed) for member mink ranchers in Utah and southern Idaho.
FBAC has been and continues to be a target of past criminal activities,
including arson which utterly destroyed its principal place of business
located in Salt Lake County, Utah; together, with continuing threats of
destruction and theft of its property from individuals who purportedly
have objections to and oppose the fur industry.

FBAC has felt the need to have some additional police presence near
and close to its facilities during those hours and times when there is
inconsistent police presence through the Unified Police Department
(UPD).
FBAC, having been made aware of such potential increased police
presence availability, by and through a related entity to UPD, under a
separate service administered and offered through UPD's "Secondary
Employment" program; contacted said program administrator. FBAC
was advised that UPD policies prohibit its officers from working
outside of the "Secondary Employment" program when providing
services to private industry, but makes provision for its officers to
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enlist in and provide independent contractor services by and through a
"Secondary Employment" program which is a separate and distinct
office/administrator coordinating those officers desirous of off-duty
work.
During the period of 2014-2015, at issue in this appeal, individual
UPD off-duty officers enrolled in the non-affiliated "Secondary
Employment" program through UPD. All off-duty UPD officers were
enrolled in and provided service log access to UPD's "Secondary
Employment" program, which otherwise was not made known to or
had any access to by FBAC.
FBAC had no notice, had no knowledge of participating UPD off-duty
officers, who were randomly assigned by and through the "Secondary
Employment" program and its administrator. FBAC provided no
direction as to the police presence to be provided, gave no instruction,
training, pace or other factors relative to control of the presence to be
provided. UPD "Secondary Employment" office would send an
invoice to FBAC, identifying the several officers by name, social
security number and hours of presence. On FBAC's part, it would
make/issue checks to each individual officer as an independent
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contractor so identified as such by the "Secondary Employment"
program.
Administrative Law Judge, Hon. Gary S. Gibbs, issued the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT:

The Appellant manufactures and distributes animal feed to farms
who raise animals for their fur. The Appellant has had concerns
about threats of destruction of its property from individuals who may
be against the industry. The Appellant desired to have security and a
greater police presence around its facility during times when the
Appellant was not present. The Appellant contacted the Unified
Police Department (UPD) requesting additional police presence
around its facility. The Unified Police Department has a secondary
employment program that coordinates secondary employment for its
police officers. According to UPD policies it prohibits police officers
from working outside the UPD providing security services outside the
secondary employment program. The UPD agreed to assist in the
scheduling of police officers to provide presence and security at the
Appellant's facility. During the years 2014 and 2015, the individuals
on Exhibits 21 through 27 of the hearing record as being included as
employees provided services to Appellant as police officers or security
officers. The Appellant paid the officers directly after the Appellant
(sic UPD) provided the names and times the officers provided their
services to the Appellant. The UPD set the fee for the officers'
services at $30 per hour, which the Appellant paid.
All of the officers were employees of the UPD. The UPD pays
officers $700 per year for them to purchase any tools or equipment or
supplies needed to provide services as a police officer. Often this
amount is not sufficient to cover all costs and the officers at times may
purchase items using their own money. The officers also provide
services to other companies through the UPD secondary employment
program.

111
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The officers enroll in the secondary employment program with the
UPD in order to be available for the secondary jobs and indicate when
they would be available to provide these services. The UPD would
then schedule the officers according to the Appellant's needs.
When the officers provided the services to the Appellant they word
UPD uniforms and drove a UPD vehicle.
The Appellant did not require the officers to follow any instructions as
to how to provide their services. The Appellant provided no training
and did not require them to perform their services in any certain pace
or sequence. The officers provided services on an as-needed basis.
1
[R 137-138]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Board of Appeals concluded that off-duty UPD officers engaged in
providing police/law enforcement presence for hire are employees and
not independent contractors and to have provided a service for a wage
under a contract for the Appellant, pursuant to the provisions of §§35A
4-204(1), 204(3), and 208 of the Utah Employment Security Act. The
Board in support of its conclusions extracts and cites portions of various
Rules and case law. The Board relies heavily on Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303 as codified in Utah Employment Security Act, provisions
set forth herein-above. However, in doing so and in providing case
12 I ~.: '.l
1 ,

1
.•
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law precedence seemingly ignores Utah Administrative Procedures Act
~

(UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) by failing to give due weight
and credence to substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the Board. Problematic in the Board's Decision are
Findings of Fact, when viewed in a favorable light to the record in its
entirety and the unique facts and laws relative to off-duty UPD police
officers performing secondary employment skills. Findings of Fact of
the initial Hearing Officer and the Administrative Law Judge on appeal,
which most reasonably and accurately reflect the true nature of the offduty UPD officers, their unique challenge to establishing an independent
business and reasonable compliance under such unique facts in the
compliance with and to R994-204-303 Independent Contractor Status are
at odds with the Decision of the Board. Appellant FBAC herein provides
statutory and case law precedence establishing the legitimacy of the
independant contractor relationship between off-duty UPD officers and
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the services provided to Appellant.
ARGUMENT
REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SUPPORTING
ALJ'S DECISION AND ORDER, AND AS INCORPORATED IN
THE BOARD OF APPEALS DECISION, ARE NOT
REFLECTEDINTHEFACTSPRESENTED

The Hon. Gary S. Gibbs stated in the Administrative Law
~

Telephonic Hearing of October 5, 2016 in response to concerns raised by
Appellant FBAC as to the prior Hearing before Workforce Services Hearing
Officer, Susan Cottom, held prior to July 20, 2016, with written "Conclusion"
issued and mailed on July 20, 2016 [R81-87]; the following
statement/representation [R 6] when challenged by FBAC as to the
representations by Ms. Susan Cottom relative to what records, testimony and
information would be maintained and included in the official records for
appeal; and as subsequently included in the Board of Appeals records for
consideration, found in the records [R 165]: "Where not inconsistent with this
decision, the reasoning and conclusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge
are adopted in full." By reasonable extension, the Hon. Gary S. Gibbs, ALJ
stated:
141

i)
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"So, I'm gonna go through the documents that were used in the
original Department Decision which I may use in making my
Decision as well." [R 6]
Appellant FBAC reasonably relied on the statement and representation of the
ALJ, which include by extension that evidence, testimony (which included,
among others, Kenneth Hansen as coordinator for UPD, Heather Lyn Drips in
~

her capacity as a UPD detective and Zach Bench as a UPD detective who
testified that both of said officers had participated in rendered police presence
on behalf of Appellant FBAC under UPD's "Secondary Employment" program.
[R 81]. FBAC contends that the "Finding of Fact" issued by Hearing Officer
Susan Cottom address inconsistencies found in her "Conclusion" of July 20,
2016 [R 86]; the Administrative Law Judge's "Reasoning and Conclusions of
Law" [R 138-142] and "Decision and Order" [R 143] date issued and sent on
October 12, 2016: and, the Board of Appeals "Decision" [R .165]. Appellant
FBAC cites the relevant omission from the "Findings of Fact" as found in the

~

records of Hearing Officer Susan Cottom, concerning "Officers" as follows:

"Officers
Officers used by the Appellant are employees of the Unified Police
Department (UPD). UPD has a program within their department
for Officers searching for secondary employment. UPD Officers
seeking part time jobs outside of the department must coordinate
through the Secondary Employment Coordinator (Coordinator).
The Appellant contacts the Secondary Employment Coordinator
(Coordinator) or UPD and specifies when and where they need
officers. The Coordinator lists the job in the UPD software system.
151

p '.' '.'
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Many of these secondary jobs are considered by UPD to be contract
work. UPD's secondary employer states; 'It is the responsibility of
the employer to maintain all Federal and State Tax records in accordance with City, State, and Federal guidelines for each officer employed.'
Officers access the system twice a month and submit their name for
jobs they are interested in working. Officers are assigned jobs and
receive their schedule from the UPD Coordinator. UPD determines
the hourly pay Officers received for these jobs. The Appellant
receives an invoice from UPD listing the individual Officers that
provided security services for them. The Appellant issues individual
checks to the Officers. The Appellant sends the checks to the UPD
Coordinator to distribute to the Officers. Appellant issues the
Officers a 1099 at the end of the year for their services.
"Officers use their UPD uniforms and police vehicles when providing
services for the Appellant. They also use guns, handcuffs, radios
and bullet proof vests. Some of the equipment is purchased by them
and some of it is the property of UPD. The Appellant is charged a
fee by UPD for the use of the car and gas. UPD expects the Officers
to respond to any emergency calls if they are needed while working
these part time jobs. The Officers work for several different
companies through UPD's secondary employment system. Officers
have not obtained business licenses, liability insurance, or Workers
Compensation insurance with the intent of being independent.
"The Appellant gives general instructions to the Officers regarding
the security detail. The Officers are expected to adhere to UPD's
secondary employment policy. Officers are trained on how to
handle various incidents and threats. The scheduling is handled by
UPD's software system. If an Officer scheduled to work for
Appellant is unable to work the shift, the UPD Coordinator must
approve the replacement. The Appellant and their staff have very
little interaction with the Officers during their shift. The UPD
Coordinator is the liaison between the Appellant and the Officers.
[R 81-83], (Emphasis added).
Appellant FBAC cites §35A-4-204, Utah Code Ann. Definitio·n of
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Employment. in support of its contention that UPD off-duty officers providing

a police presence near its premises grants a statutory exception to the
Employment Security Act for determination of independent contractor status,
per the following provision:
U.C.A. §35A-4-402(3) provides such on the following criteria:
" .... it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that:
(a)The individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession or business of the
same nature as that involved in the contract of hire for
services; and
(b)the individual has been and will continue to be free from
control or direction over the means of performance of those
services, both under the individuals contract of hire and in
fact.
In addition to the record of and prior testimony ofUPD Secondary Employment
Coordinator Kenneth Hansen, UPD Detective Heather Lyn Drips, UPD
Detective Zach Bench and Appellant FBAC General Manger Christopher Falco;
the following uncontroverted testimony was summarily received at the
~

Administrative Law Telephonic Hearing before the Hon. Gary G. Gibbs on
October 5, 2016, the following testimony is and should be held determinative

¼ll

of independent contractor status of off-duty UPD officers under Administrative
Rules R994-204-303(1)(b) and R994-204-303(2)(b) which states that these
sections are intended only as aids in the analysis for the facts of each case,
more specifically noting that the degree of importance of each factor varies
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depending on the service and the factual context in which it is performed.
Finally, noting that some factors do not apply to certain services and, therefore
should not be considered.
Administrative Law Rule R994--204-303. Factors for Determining

Independent Contractor Status, provide guidelines for determination through
special scrutiny of the facts unique to the employment relationship to aid in
determining whether a worker is independently established in a like trade,
occupation, profession or business that is free from control and direction. Each
service and the weight of each factor expressed as merely guidelines are
intended only as aids in each case.

R994--204--303:

( 1)

Independently Established.

(a)

An individual will be considered customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business if
the individual is, at the time the service is performed, regularly
engaged in a trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same
nature as the service performed, and the trade, occupation, profession,
or business is established independently of the alleged employer. In
other words, an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business is created and exists apart from a relationship
with a particular employer and does not depend on a relationship with
any one employer for its continued existence.

(b)

The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a
worker is customarily engaged in an independently trade or business:

181
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(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of business
separate from that of the employer.
(ii) Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in
the tools, equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the
services. However, "tools of the trade" used by certain trades or crafts
do not necessarily demonstrate independence.
(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the
same nature for other clients and is not required to work exclusively
for one employer.

(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risk a loss from
expenses and debts incurred through an independently established
business activity.
(v) Advertising. The worker advertises services in telephone
directories, newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods
clearly demonstrating an effort to generate business.
(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary
business, trade or professional licenses.
(vii) Business Records and tax Forms. The worker maintains records
or documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or
income earned so he or she may file self-employment and other
business tax forms with the Internal Revenue Service and other
agencies.
(c) If an employer proves to the satisfaction of the Department that the
worker is customari8ly engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business of the same nature as the service in
question, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the employer did
not have the right of or exercise direction or control over the service.
(2)

Control and Direction.

(a) When an employer retains the right to control and direct the
performance of a service, or actually exercises control and direction
over the worker who performs the service, not only as the to the result
to be accomplished by the work but also the manner and means by
which that result is to be accomplished, the worker is an employee of
the employer for the purposes of the Act.
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(b) The following factors, if applicable, will be used as aids in
determining whether an employer has the rights of or exercises control
and direction over the service of a worker:
(i) Instructions. A worker who is required to comply with the other
persons' instructions about how the service is to be performed is
ordinarily an employee. This factor is present if the employer for
whom the service is performed has the right to require compliance
with the instructions.

(ii) Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an
experienced person to work with the worker, by corresponding with
the worker, by requiring the worker to attend meetings, or by using
other methods, indicates that the employer for who the service is
performed expects the service to be performed in a particular method
or manner.
(iii) Pace of Sequence. A requirement that the service must be
performed at a pace or ordered sequence of duties imposed by the
employer indicates control or direction. The coordinating and
scheduling of the services of more than none worker does not indicate
control or direction.
(iv) Work on Employer's Premises. A requirement that the service be
performed on the employer's premises indicates that the employer for
who the service is performed has retained a right to9 supervise and
oversee the manner in which the service is performed a right to
supervise and oversee the manner in which the service is performed
especially if the service could be performed elsewhere.
( v) Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be
performed personally and may not be assigned to others indicates the
right to control or direct the manner in which the work is performed.
(vi) Continuous Relationship. A continuous service relationship
between the worker and the employer indicates that an employeremployee relationship exists. A continuous relationship may exist
where work is performed regularly or at frequently recurring although
irregular intervals. A continuous relationship does not exist where the
worker is contracted to complete specifically identified projects, even
though the service relationship may extend over a significant period of
time.
20 I.·
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(vii) Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific
number of hours of work by the employee indicates control.

(viii) Method of Payment. Payment by the hour, week, or
monthpoints to employer-employee relationship, provided that the
method of payment is not a convenient way of paying progress billing
as part of a fixed price agreed upon as the cost of a job. Control may
also exist when the employer determines the method of payment.

1.

Independently Established Trade or Business
Workforce Appeals Board initial and primary analysis focused

~

on the issue of an "Independently Established Trade or Business, citing Rule
994-204-303.as the prevailing guideline for determination of an employer-

~

employee relationship as opposed to Appellant FBAC's assertion that its
agreement with off-duty UPD officers was as independent contractors.
Appellant FBAC hereby incorporates the Findings of Hearing Officer Susan
Cottom previously recited herein as [R81-83] and" Reasoning and Conclusions
of Law" of ALJ Hon. Gary S. Gibbs in both support of err in reaching a

"'

determination that off-duty UPD officers are employees as opposed to
independent contractors. The record of testimony before the Adjudicative
Division on October 5, 2016 contains the following material facts, when added
to and considered in light of the Findings, to the establishment of a trade or

vJ

business by said officers. The record reflects the following testimony.
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Kenneth William Hansen testified that he is a Detective with Unified Police
Department and also serves as the Secondary Employment Coordinator [R125],
Hansen testified that Unified Police Department has a policy that all secondary
employment of its officers requires application/paperwork submission to the
Secondary Employment Coordinator and receive approval to perform such
police presence services. In qualifying for eligibility, UPD has certain software
called "Power Detail" that is used in UPD's Secondary Employment System.
Said Secondary Employment and use of Power Detail functions as a clearing
house for secondary employment opportunities for those officers desiring offduty employment opportunities. Secondary Employment with Power Detail is
used by UPD to avoid corruption and to make the distribution to off-duty
employment opportunities fair and equitable to all UPD officers voluntarily
seeking supplementary income opportunities in the trade/profession of their
professional training. [See Hansen R 125-126].
The Secondary Employment program offered through UPD, and
its Power Detail require that participating officers set a standard for dress and
the Department's requirements for service. Secondary Employment negotiates
the rate of compensation and provides bi-monthly invoicing to Appellant and
other such entities requesting like services. UPD requires that off-duty officers
be in uniform and conduct themselves as certified law enforcement officers,
22
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they must meet UPD standards and requirements of which Appellant FBAC has
no input or voice concerning the same. [See Hansen R 126-127]. Upon
questioning, Hansen testified that to his knowledge state law prohibits law
enforcement officers from having a private security license.[See Hansen R
128], By reasonable deduction, a duly licensed and certified law enforcement
officer desiring secondary employment must use, employ and obtain approval
through UPD Secondary Employment. By further reasonable extension,
Secondary Employment and application of Power Detail by any one individual
officer is voluntary and constitutes and separate and distinct ''Separate Place of
Business" for each officer due to the very intrinsic nature that it is neither
~

mandatory and requires each participating officer to provide ongoing, current
information as to time date and hours worked for each respective entity. [See
Hansen R128-130]. Officers participating in the Secondary Employment
program must agree to follow the requirements of the program, but in fact,

~

ultimately contract with the separate entity absent further agreement with
Secondary Employment [See Hansen R 126].

Appellant FBAC asserts that its contact with and arrangements
for added security presence is strictly between the Secondary Employment
Coordinator; and, that contact is/was merely an initial inquiry, agreement to use

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

off-duty officers, receive bi-monthly invoicing as to the names and social of the
actual officers who provided service, to be followed by a year-end 1099 IRS tax
form for monies paid to any particular officer. [See Falco, R 119]. In addition,
Appellant FBAC had no direct contact with off-duty officers, had no input in
which officers were assigned, provided no training or instruction and had no
access to Secondary Employment Power Detail program and software. [See
Falco R 119-124]. UPD Secondary Employment, as a separate and distinct
entity, with a like separate and distinct place of business classified off-duty
officers as independent contractors. Accordingly, under the terms ofUPD
Secondary Employment policies any and all off-duty officers were randomly
assigned per "Power Detail System" software as mandated for all off-duty UPD
officers seeking additional off-duty law enforcement opportunities. Appellant
FBAC had no authority to use, request, hire, discharge or provide any personal
instruction to the officers who were otherwise unknown by name until after the
services to FBAC had been performed. Further, UPD Secondary Employment
office, as a distinct and separate entity established for the benefit of off-duty
officers as the entity for on behalf of said officers who qualified under the
Secondary Employment policies to be eligible to request work opportunities.
All off-duty UPD secondary employment is on a volunteer basis. Upon
acceptance under Power Detail Systems software as administered by UPD
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Secondary Employment, off-duty officers then selects, from potentially
numerous listed job offers, those which a particular officer has interest in
providing service to. No officer may proceed into the system without first
having agreed to the terms and requirements as posted by UPD Secondary
Employment. [See Falco R 113-121] and [See Hansen R 128-133]. Appellant
FBAC was instructed and invoiced by UPD Secondary Employment for offduty officers classified as independent contractors. All of the off-duty officers
were assigned to FBAC without the knowledge ofFBAC or instruction from
FBAC. [Falco testimony] UPD Secondary Employment maintained a separate,
distinct place of business at which and through Power Detail System software
accessible only by qualified UPD officers could view various off-duty job
opportunities, maintain individual off-duty officers work/billing hours, client
lists, job requirements, etc with the purpose of matching eligible officers to a
specific job and to rotate officers on an equitable basis. UPD Secondary
~

Employment Office generated billing invoices to FBAC and other like entities
seeking a law enforcement presence. The off-duty officers did not have access
to any of FBAC facilities, including but not limited to restrooms, supplies,
computers, office space or like FBAC premises; officers would otherwise patrol
the general area of the real property and surrounding neighborhood from

~

adjacent public streets. FBAC did not know or was unable to verify whether an
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assigned off-duty officer, as invoiced by UPD Secondary Employment Office,
did in fact provide any law enforcement presence for the dates and hours billed.
[Falco testimony] Services rendered to FBAC and other like entities in need or
requesting additional law enforcement presence were at all material times, by
the terms ofUPD Secondary Employment Office operating under the auspices
of a separate office as evidenced by the generation of invoices to FBAC,
collection of invoiced fees and distribution of payment checks. [Falco
testimony]
In support of Workforce Appeals Board "Decision", reference
and citation to prior case law was made based upon the facts of Petro-Hunt,
LLC v. Dep 1 of Workforce Servs., 197 P.3d 107, 114 (Utah App 2008) wherein

the Board extrapolated the requirements that an individual was individually
established and free from control and direction. The clear and undisputed
testimony of the UPD Secondary Employment Coordinator, Kenneth Hansen,
was that by state law and UPD policy, an off-duty officer could only perform
security and provide police presence but for application and acceptance into the
UPD Secondary Employment Office as a separate and distinct entity apart from
UPD as a law enforcement agency. Only by and through UPD Secondary
Employment Office, which is the sole means an off-duty officer may ply his/her
unique certified skills and training in law enforcement could request, on a
261P~l~t'
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voluntary basis, such additional like trade or business opportunities. As further
testified, UPD Secondary Employment Office was a separate and distinct entity
which provided "pass through" business communications and services for the
benefit of off-duty officers which include invoicing, collection of fees, record
keeping relative to dates, times, hours and rate of pay for each respective
officer. A fair reading and application of Petro-Hunt and the unique facts of the
services provided by off-duty UPD officers are clearly distinguishable. UPD
Secondary Employment Office is in fact a separate place of business for the
benefit of off-duty officers, further providing business records and record
keeping as the same may be generally required by any independent contractor
(j

to maintain the R994-204-303(b )(i) " ... place of business separate from that of
an employer", which under the facts at hand would be Appellant FBAC. Lost
in the citation of Petro-Hunt is the crucial and essential fact, the purported
independent contractor shared equipment with the employer. There is
absolutely no such like fact in the matter before this Court. FBAC provides no
tools or equipment to UPD officers and UPD officers provide no tools or
equipment to FBAC. If the Court were to apply the conclusions drawn by the
Board from Petro-Hunt then by reasonable extension of the argument, off-duty
UPD officers would in fact be sole employees of UPD and most certainly not
employees of FBAC. FBAC challenges the Board's findings of fact in that they
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are not supported by substantial evidence as required under §63-46b-16(4)(g).
U.C.A., as viewed in light of the entire record before the court. See Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board ofReview, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989; Department
oftheAirForcev. Swider, 824P.2d448,451 (UtahApp.1991. Quoting from
First National Bank ofBoston v. County Board ofEqualization, 199 P.2d 1163

(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court state that" '[s]ubstantial evidence is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reason
mind to support a conclusion." Id. at 1165. The Court also stated that appellate
~

courts, when applying the substantial evidence test of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4), are required to
consider not only the evidence supporting the Board's findings but also the
evidence negating them. Id. See Swider, 824 P.2d at 451, Grace Drilling, 776
P.2d at 68. No agency enjoys the discretion to exceed the authority vested in it
by the Legislature for legal error, without deference. See Utah Code § 63-46bl 6(4)(d) ( 1989). See also Adams v. Board ofReview, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App.
1991); LaSal Oil Co. v. Department ofEnvtl. Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047
(Utah App. 1992). Appellant FBAC contends and argues that the unique set of
facts and statutory requirements imposed on law enforcement officers, taken in
their entirety reasonably and rationally lead to a conclusion of independent
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contractor status. In support of Appellant FBAC's contention, see Tasters Ltd,.

Inc. v. Department ofEmployment Sec., 863 P.2d 12 (Utah 1993)

2.

Tools and Equipment

Workforce Appeals Board cites the case of Needle Inc. v. Dept
~

of Workforce Servs,, 2016 UT App 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) in support of a
finding that workers did not make a substantial investment in tools and
equipment when they purchased computers ;and internet service before
employment and not in relation to the service performed for the purported
employer. Workforce Appeals Board quoted from Needle, in part:
[C]omputors and internet access are now common appurtenances
of most citizens' daily lives, used for shopping, schoolwork,
social connection, and entertainment, including online interaction.
As a consequence, it was not error for the Board to conclude that
the acquisition of a computer and internet access was not a
"substantial investment" in tools of a trade
As in Grace Drilling Co., Swider and First National Bank ofBoston, the § 6346b-16(4) UAPA test has not been evenly and adequately applied to negating
the Board's findings. Further, the aforementioned cases require the Board to
not only consider the evidence supporting the Board's findings but also the
evidence negating them. The Board of Appeals own Findings of Fact state:
[A]ll of the officers were employees of the UPD. The UPD pays
officers $700 per year for them to purchase any tools or equipment
or supplies needed to provide services as a police officer. Often
29 I Pa~;
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this amount is not sufficient to cover all costs and the officers at
times may purchase items using their own money.
'11

Kenneth Hansen, UPD Secondary Employment Office Coordinator further
testified that the $700 dollar a year paid by UPD to its officers is insufficient to
cover additional lights, body armor, their own weapons, boots and other annual
tools of the trade. By necessity, UPD officers must make an investment in the
tools of their primary occupation that would also be mandated by/or off-duty
UPD secondary employment which by policy requires an off-duty officer
providing law enforcement presence to be in uniform. [See Hansen R 127128]. FBAC further advances the argument that each trade, profession or other
independently established service relationships do not stand on equal footing
when it comes to a factual determination of "substantial investment", i.e.
Certified Public Accounts working as independent contractors would not be
reasonably likely to have a substantial investment in tools and equipment; but,
rather it is the certification as such which is the substantial investment.
Likewise, off-duty UPD officers providing a law enforcement presence is law
enforcement training and certification driven investment my each respective
officer who is voluntarily participating in secondary employment.

3.

Other Clients, Profit or Loss, Advertising and Business Records
30
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Workforce Appeals Board again cites and relies upon Needles in
its "Decision", applying Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303{l)(a) further citing
Leach v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 123 Utah 423, 260 P.2d 744, 748

(Utah 1953), Evolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs,. 2015 UT App
61,374 P.3d 406 (quoting Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l){b)(iii) for the
proposition that it was not error for the Department of Workforce Services to
determine that a claimant "did not perform work for clients other than
Evolocity". Such an approach clearly ignores the testimony of Kenneth
Hansen, UPD Secondary Employment Coordinator's testimony.
Adherence to the "Standard of Review" promulgated in Tasters
Ltd,. Inc v. Department ofEmployment Sec., 863 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1993) the

Board's decision is and must be governed by the applicable provisions of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)
(1989) wherein under UAPA, an agency's factual findings will be affirmed
~

"only if they are 'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court"' See Grace Drilling Co., Swider and First
National Bank of Boston. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "

' [s]ubstantial evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Further, the
Utah Supreme Court has also stated that appellate courts, when applying the
31
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substantial evidence test under UAPA. Are required to consider not only the
evidence supporting the Board's finding but also the evidence negating them.
Taken in this light, the Board has acted to dismissively in considering the
testimony of Kenneth Hansen ,UPD Secondary Employment Coordinator who
testified on direct examination that off-duty officers did provide similar
services for other companies besides FBAC. His testimony included a variety
of companies/entities that off-duty officers provide services for under UPD
Secondary Employment program which include, but not limited to construction
IJ

company, marathon races and all other/different races and further opined that
one would be unlikely to find any off-duty officer providing law enforcement
presence that doesn't work for another company. Specifically, Mr. Hansen
identified Allstate Insurance Company with a need for law enforcement
presence for an attorney threatened by one of the customers due to a declination

•

of claim. [See Hansen R 129).
Workforce Appeals Board likewise diminishes the
uncontroverted evidence supporting "Profit and Loss" and "Advertising". Once
again, both statutory provisions and legal precedence trump the Board's
concerted effort to seemingly ignore the uncontroverted testimony of Kenneth
Hansen and FBAC general manager, Christopher Falco. The essence of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, (UAPA) test, codified in Utah Code Ann.,
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§ 63-46b-16(4) 1989, as cited in Tasters Ltd.,, Inc. v. Department of
Employment Sec. 863 P.2d 12 (Utah 1993) testified as to the profit potential and

risk of loss (non-payment). [See Falco R 117-118]. Administrative Law Rule,
R994-204-303(1 )(b)(iv) "Profit or Loss" is notably silent as to the specifics of
profit or risks of loss from expenses and debts incurred through an
independently established business activity. By prior example provided by
Appellant, a Certified Public Accountant working as an independent contractor
has the reasonable expectation to realize a profit; but, risk of loss would be
potentially minimal due to the apparent lack of need for any substantial
investment in or risk of loss related to any investment. The CPA's reasonable
C;j

risk of loss would be comparable to that of an off-duty UPD officer who may
not be paid for services rendered and conceivably lost the opportunity to
~

provide like services to a paying client.

Workforce Appeals Board fails to consider the prior directives
cited herein-above as the same relate to R994-204-303(l)(b)(v) "Advertising".
The uncontroverted testimony of Christopher Falco that he found and became
aware of UPD Secondary Employment Program through word of mouth. The
Rule does not exclude "word of mouth" as a clear demonstration of effort to
generate business. The Court in Tasters reaffirmed the statutory test
33 I Pa

!2

t.:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

promulgated under the Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), codified in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989), cited in First National Bank of Boston,
799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990) wherein the Court stated that appellate courts are
required to consider not only the evidence supporting the Board's findings but
also the evidence negating them. In this instance, there was no evidence
presented to the contrary that "word of mouth" was not an effective, productive

~

means to advertise UPD Secondary Employment services to the public.

4.

Business Records
This issue has previously been addressed herein at paragraph 1.

Independently Established Trade or Business. Testimony of Kenneth
Hansen, UPD Secondary Employment Coordinator established the role Power
Detail System software, and qualified off-duty UPD officers seeking
employment opportunities gain once accepted and provided secure log-in
capability. Job opportunities, requirements, rate of pay, date/time/hour log
retention for invoicing purposes to client, check collection and disbursement;

~

together with an annual 1099 IRS statement of monies paid by FBAC to each
respective off-duty officer, all constitute essential and reasonable records one
would expect in an established , excluded business under Utah Code Ann.
§35A-4-204, and the exemption guidelines applicable to establish independent

34
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contractor status under Utah Administrative Rule, R994-204-303 and
li

specifically R994-204-303 (l)(a) and R994-204-303(1)(b)(vii) ..

Gi.l

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
FBAC has demonstrated, as the record "Findings of Fact"
issued by the Initial Hearing Officer (Susan Cottom), the ALJ's "Findings of
Fact" (Hon. Gary S Gibbs) and the Workforce Board of Appeals adoption of the
Administrative Law Judge's "Factual Findings" that at all material times offduty UPD officers were established as exempt independent contractors by
virtue of the relevant, unique facts to be considered under Utah Statutes and
Administrative Rules, when applied under the legislative guidelines
promulgated to make such employment determinations. The Utah Supreme
Court made it clear and the plain language found in the Utah Administrative
procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) that appellate courts,
when applying the substantial evidence test under UAPA, are required to
consider not only the evidence supporting the Board's findings but also the
evidence negating them. Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that
substantial evidence is of such quantum and quality as there exists relevant
evidence adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
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In the matter at hand, Appellant FBAC has provided relevant
evidence adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support off-duty UPD

~

officers performing law enforcement presence, under no control or supervision
of client FBAC; and, otherwise providing credible, uncontroverted evidence as
more specifically detailed in the Utah Administrative Rules, R994-204-303.
Appellant seeks a determination that off-duty UPD officers
engaged in providing a police/law enforcement presence at or near the vicinity
of Appellant FBAC/s facility be correctly classified as independent contractors
(iJ

and not employees of Appellant at all times material to the Workforce Services
audit at issue and such potential future relationship Appellant may have with
off-duty UPD officers performing consistent to the terms expressed herein.

DATED this 3rd day of May, 2017.

R.~TT RAWLINGS
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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